



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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## Did Macmillan Succeed?

by William H. Stringer

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's "reconnaissance" in Moscow has terminated in something better than a Napoleonic retreat. Indeed the majority of British public opinion seems to agree with the prime minister's own televised comment, made at London Airport on his return on March 3, that the trip was worthwhile.

Its usefulness, however, lies not in the realm of negotiation, but in "reconnaissance"—which means careful exploration—by East and West of each other's prepared positions, and their determination and willingness to negotiate. Ten days of Soviet blandishments and Edwardian courtesy—interrupted by Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's essay in brinkmanship (or, as he put it, electioneering) midway through the talks—produced the following positive results:

1. Moscow has dropped its insistence that East-West talks should take place exclusively at a summit meeting. It has agreed, in a note handed to Western ambassadors on March 2, to attend a foreign ministers' meeting on German and European problems. It is implicitly saying also that if realistic negotiations are in progress at the foreign ministers' level

in May, then its May 27 deadline for handing over Soviet occupation functions to the East German regime will be extended.

2. Simultaneously the U.S.S.R. has made it very clear that its Berlin demands are unchanged. East Germany, according to the Soviet note, is to become "complete master over the communications between West Berlin and West Germany." If there is any flexibility here, Mr. Macmillan did not discover it in his lengthy talks with Mr. Khrushchev.

3. The British prime minister let it be known in Moscow through his press chiefs that he personally is not opposed to a summit conference—indeed, that he feels this is the only means of negotiating finally and effectively with Mr. Khrushchev, boss of the U.S.S.R. Presumably he expressed this view to President Eisenhower when he conferred with him in Washington.

4. Mr. Macmillan adroitly sidestepped Khrushchev's proposal for an Anglo-Russian nonaggression pact, thereby holding firmly to the Anglo-American alliance. The Briton offered instead a three-point declaration pledging both nations to abide by the United Nations Charter, to negotiate disputes and not

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to act unilaterally to prejudice the interests of others. In signing this declaration Mr. Khrushchev would have pledged himself not to change unilaterally the status of Berlin. He has not signed.

5. What is significant is that the two leaders called for further study of the possibility of limiting armed forces and atomic and conventional weapons "in an agreed area of Europe" as a means of increasing European security. This is very nearly a nod of approval to the Rapacki plan.

6. London and Moscow initiated minor agreements on the exchange of trade and culture.

7. Of special importance in the propaganda arena, Prime Minister Macmillan delivered an eloquent 30-minute television speech in Moscow on March 2, making the most of a rare opportunity to tell several million listening Russians the facts about Britain. Translated paragraph by paragraph as it was being delivered, it was a unique, unjammed penetration into Russian thinking.

It is generally recognized that Macmillan's imperturbability saved the Moscow mission from disaster in mid-career. This was when Premier Khrushchev — having packed the British delegation safely off to visit a nuclear research center 90 miles distant—made an unheralded belligerent speech at Moscow attacking and ridiculing the Western proposal for a foreign ministers' meeting and Western plans for Germany.

Some members of the Macmillan party were in favor of quitting Moscow in umbrage then and there. But the prime minister decided to stick

it out. Had he returned home, the trip would have been adjudged a failure. As it is, most British newspaper comment adjudges the trip at least a limited success.

### Success, Limited

Labor party leaders had all along urged the government to "explore" prospects for negotiations with the U.S.S.R., and it is known that both Hugh Gaitskell and Aneurin Bevan were considering a trip to Moscow themselves—when the prime minister stole their thunder. Thus the Opposition today can make little capital out of the fact that a mission they advised and urged failed to set-

The next *Headline Series*—March-April—will be, "Japan: New Problems, New Promises," by Paul F. Langer.

tle the Berlin question. The general British view is that, with United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles ill, Britain's prime minister has usefully taken the Western diplomatic lead. The London *Times* said editorially, "Now he [Macmillan] will speak with greater authority . . . the responsibility falling on the British prime minister to lead the alliance sensibly and yet strongly in the weeks ahead is paramount."

The impact of Macmillan's Moscow venture on the upcoming British general elections, however, may be minor. British opinion is likely to be swayed more by the country's unemployment figures—whether they are still on the increase or have declined substantially when the government

calls the election. The fact that May, earlier considered a likely election month, will bring either a foreign ministers' conference of uncertain duration or a menacing Berlin deadline—makes spring less likely as a time for balloting. An October election is now generally expected.

British opinion very definitely favors flexibility in negotiating the question of Germany's future. London is not as insistent as Washington on the point that free elections are the only route to German unification—or at least to some kind of German confederation. In the imminent allied preparatory talks this spring London can be expected to urge broad, realistic negotiations on Germany and on European security.

For the moment it can be said that frankness at Moscow has been salutary. The West is alerted to realize that Mr. Khrushchev is determined to get the Western allies out of Berlin. It also realizes that Mr. Khrushchev is well on the way to setting up a conference which will be convening "under the gun" of his threat to hand over Berlin's access controls to the East Germans.

Simultaneously, Mr. Macmillan has convinced the Soviet premier that Britain cannot be split from the United States, and that careful negotiations may yet produce useful results. A trip to Moscow which was undertaken partly for domestic political purposes has at least cleared the international atmosphere.

Mr. Stringer, chief of the Washington News Bureau of *The Christian Science Monitor* and author of the front-page column, "The State of the Nations," closely follows affairs in Britain.

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## NATO's First Decade: A Balance Sheet

NATO—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization — is celebrating the tenth anniversary of its founding on April 4, 1959.

The problem facing anyone who writes about this anniversary is that in praising NATO one may be charged with ignoring its failures; or while analyzing its faults, be accused of minimizing its virtues. There is no doubt, however, that NATO has proved invaluable as a shield against Soviet aggression, even though it has obviously failed to do much about economic and political cooperation and association among its 15 members.

The very fact, however, that this peacetime coalition has survived for ten years is something of an accomplishment. To say that NATO has plenty of faults and weaknesses does not detract from the immense, almost incredible, success it has had as a deterrent against aggression by the Soviet bloc in Europe. Its military forces, minute by comparison to those of Russia, have, in fact, been an effective protection against Moscow's superiority in manpower and arms.

Moreover, NATO, while creating a unique and effective deterrent force, has survived the weaknesses and rivalries of its members. One has only to try and imagine what Europe and the world would look like if there were no NATO to realize how important it is, in spite of its shortcomings.

One of the charges against NATO is that it is brittle and inflexible, and fails to keep up with the times. In fact, however, it has changed—although perhaps not as much or as fast as one might have wanted it to

do. NATO started out in 1949 with 12 nations, in 1951 Greece and Turkey were admitted and then, in 1954, West Germany. It started out with no divisions, and now has 20-odd divisions, with the West Germans getting more manpower ready for action, although there is no prospect that it will have the 90 divisions once contemplated. It is increasingly shifting from conventional weapons to nuclear weapons. It is building missile bases in more and more countries. It may not be doing all it should; but it is doing a lot that many people thought it could never do.

### What NATO Needs To Do

No one will deny that NATO has accomplished little, if anything, to implement Article 2 of the treaty, which calls for strengthening common free institutions, promoting conditions of stability and well-being, eliminating conflict in economic policies and encouraging economic collaboration. But if its members have not done much along these lines through NATO, many of them have been making notable progress outside the defense organization. The Coal and Steel Community of six nations is a going concern. So is Euratom. There is the Council of Europe. And now Europe has the Common Market.

True, these developments cannot be described as NATO accomplishments. But they have moved Europe, or parts of it, toward the goals outlined in the NATO treaty. And if agreement could not be reached through NATO, then it was tried outside NATO—as in the cases of Cyprus and the Common Market. The dispute as to how much greater

a voice the big powers should have in NATO than the smaller ones has still to be settled. And it is not yet clear how NATO can mesh in the non-NATO political and economic commitments of its members.

Perhaps the time will come when all these operations and activities will be brought together within one non-Communist association and under NATO's direction. But few people believe this is coming soon, and some contend this would be unwise. Yet the drive toward cooperation, integration and association of the NATO powers, and between those powers and other non-Communist groupings, goes on constantly. There is, for example, the United States Committee for the Atlantic Congress meeting in London on June 5, which will be attended by some of the ablest and most distinguished citizens of NATO countries—although quite independent of NATO or their governments. Lewis W. Douglas, former American ambassador to the Court of St. James, honorary chairman of the United States committee, has announced that the Congress's purpose is "to consider ways and means of further developing cooperation, particularly in economic and political affairs between the North American and European members of NATO, and between those countries and the underdeveloped countries outside the area of the North Atlantic Treaty."

On this tenth anniversary of the birth of NATO it is obvious that NATO has become a going concern. The question now is whether and how it will weather the crisis over Berlin.

NEAL STANFORD





## What Kind of World Is Possible?

As the West and the Soviet bloc gird themselves for a showdown—diplomatic or military—on Berlin, people around the globe are once more asking themselves, What kind of world will prove possible in the years ahead?

No responsible observer of the world scene would have the temerity of assuming the role of prophet—whether as Cassandra or Pollyanna. The most one can honestly do is to indicate the changes now under way which—barring World War III—may shape the world of the future.

*Great Powers Decline.* First, we see a far-reaching change in the position of what we have been wont to call the great powers, victors and vanquished alike.

Now a new world balance of power is held by the United States and the U.S.S.R., both of which have economic, technological and military strength, either in being or in the making, to affect the course of world events. The future shape of the world will be determined in considerable part by the current competition between these Big Two, and particularly by their capacity to attract and hold allies among the once-great powers and the newly developing nations. This is why Germany and Japan occupy such crucial positions today, because if either or both of these countries, with their vigorous population and industrial strength, shift from one to the other of the great powers, the existing balance would be sharply altered. A similarly significant change would occur if Communist China should move away from the U.S.S.R.—whether or not it then moves toward the West or adopts an independent course.

*New Nations Rise.* Second, the great-power balance, important though it still remains today, is increasingly offset by the emergence of the newly liberated and/or newly developing peoples of the non-Western world—in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America.

These peoples must, through force of their precarious circumstances, concentrate their efforts and resources on their own tremendously difficult problems of modernizing their institutions—political, economic and social—within the span of a few decades. Their preference, if not always their actual choice, is to avoid entangling alliances with either of the great-power blocs for fear that these alliances might lead to war which, even if limited, would spell the blight of their just burgeoning hopes.

To achieve their goals, they are eager to obtain aid from whatever source it may come, so as to step up the pace of their development. At the same time, they see in the United Nations the best forum for their activities, and their stoutest shield against future encroachments by the great powers.

The United States is gradually becoming reconciled to the nonalignment policy of many of the non-Western nations, a policy which our officials no longer denounce as “immoral.” And even the authoritarian U.S.S.R. has had to accept the non-alignment position of such diverse countries as Yugoslavia, Egypt and India.

*More Aid—Not Charity.* Third, the crying need of the newly developing nations for aid, whatever its source, is causing a revision of aid

concepts which has important implications for the future. The United States, confronted by the Soviet bloc's competition in aid and trade, is taking a new look at its own policies. We begin to see that aid to these countries is not charity, but the best and most effective way of helping our own economy, which today, and for many decades, has been producing far more than we consume here.

The United States, far from being isolationist, has insisted on obtaining, usually with success, an open door around the globe for American traders and investors.

In the future, if we are to continue to enjoy an open door, we shall have to help the newly independent countries to develop their resources for their own benefit and on their own terms, not primarily for our benefit and on our terms. We shall have to assure markets not only for our goods, but also for the goods of these countries, either in the United States or in other areas where we have influence. For obviously, if they cannot sell, they won't be able to buy from us or from our allies; and they will increasingly seek markets in areas which do need goods—notably the Soviet bloc.

*Prospects for Democracy.* Fourth, no matter how much aid the United States gives or lends in the future, or in what form, we cannot expect that our aid will automatically bring about democracy in the recipient countries.

We begin to see that democratic institutions are difficult to operate even in countries like France, where they have been familiar for nearly two centuries. How much more diffi-

(Continued on page 112)



## New Era in Venezuela

by Tad Szulc

Mr. Szulc, former Associated Press correspondent in Rio de Janeiro, has been chief South American correspondent of *The New York Times* since 1956. He is at work on a study of South American dictatorships, to be published in the autumn by Henry Holt and Company.

For the first time in 11 years Venezuela is governed by a freely elected president and Congress. Rómulo Betancourt, chief of the Democratic Action party, was chosen president in the December 7, 1958 elections, and his left-wing party also won majorities in the two houses of parliament. Congress convened in mid-January and Betancourt was inaugurated on February 13. This event marked the end of the transition period that began on January 23, 1958, with the revolutionary ouster of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez, the country's dictator for the preceding eight years.

This rapid establishment of a democratic regime has posed a serious challenge to Betancourt in his endeavor to normalize at long last the situation in Venezuela after more than two decades of upheavals and of the military dictatorship which followed the death in 1935 of Juan Vicente Gómez, "Tyrant of the Andes." Prior to Pérez Jiménez's overthrow Venezuela had enjoyed only three years of relative freedom when Betancourt and Democratic Action ran the nation in an inexperienced, rambling and confused fashion between 1945 and 1948.

### Betancourt's Many Problems

Taking over Venezuela's helm with a program of government incomparably more mature and better thought out than the one he offered ten years ago—his years of exile, mostly spent in Puerto Rico, where he befriended Governor Luis Muñoz Marín, were evidently not wasted—Betancourt is faced with a far-

reaching political and social ferment which is aggravated by serious economic problems. Democracy is still a heady, new experience for Venezuelans, and many forces—including the quite influential Communists, certain disappointed politicians and unreconstructed military advocates of strong regimes—are busily attempting to turn it to their own advantage.

Despite the country's immense oil revenues, the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship failed to build a sound economic base for Venezuela, and the profound distortions in the country's economic structure have resulted in the build-up of dangerous social pressures, reflected by growing unemployment in the cities. These pressures, completing the vicious circle of difficulties in Betancourt's path, could create a powerful threat to the very stability of Venezuela's recently won democracy.

While these problems offer a major domestic challenge to Betancourt, the new Venezuela also offers a challenge which is no less formidable to the United States government and to American economic interests, particularly to the oil industry. At stake are the relations between the United States and the enormously sensitive postrevolutionary Venezuelan public opinion. The Venezuelans are caught in a surge of nationalism, and are still susceptible to skillful stage-managing by Communist and non-Communist foes of the United States who pointedly keep reminding the nation of the cordiality that existed not so long ago between Pérez Jiménez and Washington.

While Betancourt himself is on record as favoring friendly relations between Venezuela and the United States, provided we treat his country "with friendship and without colonial attitudes," he and his government will be subject to anti-United States pressures emanating from many quarters. This could conceivably color the policies of Venezuela in various fields. But a realistic and understanding attitude on the part of the United States could help Betancourt to resist such pressures and would go far in counteracting anti-United States campaigns.

### Taxes on Oil

A foretaste of these pressures, and a mightily bitter one, was the sudden move by the outgoing government junta in the closing hours of 1958 to raise all corporate taxes in Venezuela and to make them retroactive for the entire past year. This action, taken without consulting the oil companies which have several billion dollars invested in Venezuela and with whom the government had a gentlemen's agreement which ruled out abrupt unilateral measures of this type—and possibly without consulting Betancourt—ended the traditional 50-50 profit-sharing formula, which had hitherto been the touchstone of oil operations throughout most of the world. The tax boost—establishing a rough 60 to 40 ratio in profit distribution—not only changed the entire pattern of oil economics in Venezuela, but it carried implications also for the position of oil companies in the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia, which for some time had

been attentively watching Venezuelan practices.

That Venezuela was on the verge of altering the tax formula had been known for some time, and nobody denied the country the right of so doing. Betancourt and the two other presidential candidates — ex-junta president Rear Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal and Dr. Rafael Caldera, a Social Christian—had agreed before the elections on a minimal government program which included winning a greater share of the oil revenues for Venezuela. These revenues are doubtless needed if the country is to embark on the road of healthy and orderly social and economic development, replacing the haphazard policies of the Jiménez dictatorship. Vast irrigation projects are essential to raise the acutely inadequate agricultural production and provide decent living standards for the misery-stricken rural population. Cheap urban and rural housing is urgently needed and so is cheap power. The country lacks schools. In brief, the great wealth of the nation must be better distributed and used.

With all this in mind, Betancourt had said on many occasions that the oil companies' return on invested capital—an average of well over 30 percent for the industry and about 40 percent for the Creole Petroleum Corporation, the world's largest producer of crude oil—was "much too high" in terms of Venezuelan realities and that it would have to be scaled down. As a result of the new taxes, the various companies' profits dropped sharply in 1958. In the case of Creole, an affiliate of Standard Oil of New Jersey, the year's earnings were \$239,000,000 or \$3.08 per share of common stock, as compared to \$397,000,000 and \$5.11 per share in 1957. The International Petroleum Company, Ltd., another Standard Oil affiliate, earned \$17,000,000 and \$1.17 per share, in 1958, as compared

to \$41,100,000 and \$2.83 per share in 1957.

Betancourt, who, as provisional president ten years earlier, had pushed through Congress a fairly arbitrary tax increase of his own, had expressed no detailed views this time on what the companies' profit margin should be. Instead, he had committed himself to study with the companies in round-table discussions what changes should be introduced into the profit formula. Recognizing that the government and the oil industry were partners in a joint enterprise and should not regard each other as adversaries, Betancourt, in postelection interviews, ruled out any unilateral steps and promised that the oil problem would not be allowed to become a political issue.

#### **Betancourt Moderate—**

Showing an understanding of the world oil picture, which has been clouded for over a year by global overproduction — Venezuela's own exports to the United States are subject to voluntary restrictions by the importing companies — Betancourt acknowledged that nothing should be done that would result in pricing Venezuela's oil out of any of its traditional markets.

While on the whole Betancourt's attitude toward the oil companies was moderate and reasonable, the junta's sudden move put him in a new and difficult position as he took over the presidency. The tax boost was applauded by the nationalistically-minded public opinion. A salvo of hasty and unsubtle attacks on the junta by several top oil companies' executives had the inevitable result of making the measure even more popular in Venezuela.

#### **—But Nationalism Strong**

Evidently, Betancourt, who had already been accused by Communists and others of having "sold out to the

United States," cannot go back on the tax rise without drastically endangering his own political position. Although Betancourt himself tends more and more toward the middle-of-the-road in politics and economics despite his rather radical past, a loud Marxist wing of his own party has been denouncing "United States imperialism" and demanding policies smacking of extreme nationalism. Having been presented with a *fait accompli* in the matter of taxes, he is certain to face new pressures to modify further—and quickly—other aspects of the oil industry.

The joint pre-election program of the three candidates also called for the eventual creation of a government oil company parallel to the privately-operated industry and for a stronger voice for Venezuela in the planning of current operations. Betancourt announced on his own that no concessions would ever be granted again to foreign companies in Venezuela—the last round of concessions was in 1956 under the dictatorship — and that new groups seeking to enter Venezuela would have to work through contracts with the projected government company, following the example set last year by the national oil monopoly corporation in Argentina.

All these plans actually worry the foreign oil companies far more than the junta's tax rise because, in the eyes of many of the executives, they may pave the way to an eventual nationalization of the industry—not so much by Betancourt, whose moderation is appreciated in oil circles, but by a future regime which may be more susceptible to a demagogic nationalism. The present concern is that the junta's action on taxes—and the accompanying feeling of pride fanned by anti-United States politicians and press that "we taught the imperialists a lesson and got away with it"—may push Betancourt, per-

Perhaps quicker than he would like, into the organization of the government-oil corporation and other steps.

The oil companies also take a dim view of any plans for the government to participate in the management of the Venezuelan production and exports. They believe that within the complex framework of world oil operations the companies must have full independence in regulating production from day to day; posting prices, working out discounts and special arrangements, and controlling the oil flow to markets.

The immediate impact of the tax increase was curtailment by the oil companies of new investments in Venezuela. In some instances, even the programmed expansion plans for 1959 were halted, pending new developments, thus curtailing employment possibilities. All this comes at a time when the new Betancourt administration is faced with mounting unemployment and the urgent need to find work for tens of thousands of idle men and women. The flow of investments in other fields, extremely slow since the January 1958 revolution, has been further arrested by the junta's tax measure, which affected other industries as well. The flight of capital from Venezuela that began a year ago continued early this year, although it had not reached alarming proportions.

### New Capital Needed

In Venezuela's top-heavy economic structure, a steady flow of new money is essential to maintain the rhythm of economic activity and to go on creating new sources of wealth. A noticeable decrease in public works—ordered when the junta had to abandon some of the most spectacular Pérez Jiménez projects in order to pay the huge debt inherited from the dictatorship and to balance the budget—combined with the curtailment of investments to bring about

something along the lines of economic stagnation, in contrast with the artificial boom of the past years, and sharpened the unemployment crisis. There was no immediate word concerning the expansion plans of the iron ore companies (second in importance to oil) which were also hit by the tax increase.

The motives of the junta in lowering the tax boom in the manner in which it was done were not entirely clear, but they were politically inspired. From the financial viewpoint the oil tax provided Venezuela with over \$220 million, which, perhaps by coincidence, was the amount the junta had planned to borrow from the syndicate of United States banks to pay off the Pérez Jiménez debts. The junta had planned to go through with the loan, but various technicalities delayed it, and it was left for Betancourt, who agreed with the measure, to carry out the loan.

### What U.S. Can Do

Rómulo Betancourt and his party still have many foes in Venezuela—oddly enough “anti-Romulismo” is the only thing the Communists and some of the military have in common these days—and there are people who are betting that Betancourt's administration will not serve out its term, which runs to 1964. Although the top military commanders have pledged their support to Betancourt, it should be pointed out that sentiment in the armed forces runs high against the new president because of resentment dating back to his party's rule a decade ago.

Betancourt's main political task will be to conciliate these tendencies, at least to the extent of keeping his regime intact, or to keep them divided. He will need the support of the United States and the cooperation of big American business in Venezuela—along with an enlightened and understanding attitude to-

ward the country's problems—so that he may have more flexibility in coping with the Communist-encouraged extreme nationalist sentiment.

A tough attitude toward Venezuela by American corporations with interests there, or a refusal by Washington to come fully to terms with the realities of Betancourt's leftist but anti-Communist views which reflect modern Venezuelan trends, would fatally push him closer to nationalist groups.

In the political field the United States must identify itself as fully and as clearly as possible with the democratic regime in Venezuela to lay at rest once and for all the memories of the close relationship between Washington and the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship. Not only would such a policy offset the Communist propaganda in Venezuela, but it would also help to marshal on our side the still uncommitted liberal forces in the country. The allegiance of these forces is busily sought by the very active Communist party, represented in Congress by the entire five-man presidium of its central committee, and successfully infiltrated in the Caracas press, in professional organizations and in important high school and university groups.

A sympathetic and constructive attitude by the United States at all levels—government as well as private—could go far to weaken the campaign of the Communists, whose policy is to become ostentatiously associated with every legitimate aspiration of the Venezuelans, from the most trivial to the most vital.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Rómulo Betancourt, *Posición y Doctrina*, Collection of speeches (Caracas, Editorial Cordillera, 1958); Rómulo Betancourt, *Interpretación de su doctrina popular y democrática* (Caracas, Editorial Suma, 1958); Hubert Herring, *A History of Latin America* (New York, Knopf, 1956); J. Fred Rippy, *Latin America: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1958); William Lytle Schurz, *Latin America* (New York, Dutton, 1941).



## Spotlight

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cult it is for institutions of the Western type to emerge in the non-Western countries, which have not had the traditions and experience of the West. This does not mean that we must gloomily prepare ourselves for an era of dictatorships and antidemocratic sentiment outside the Atlantic community, or for the triumph of communism. Rather, as Ceylon's Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike said in an interview on March 7, we need to recognize that while Western democratic institutions may not be adapted for conditions in non-Western countries, these countries may develop their own patterns of democracy, as is the case in India. And Russian communism, which is itself being transformed by economic and social changes in the U.S.S.R., may seem as alien to many of the non-Western peoples as the institutions of Britain and the United States.

In any case, whatever the future may bring, the United States could benefit by the advice of Raymond Robins, one of the best-informed World War I experts on Russia, who said: "There is a big difference between trying to save people and trying to help them. With luck you can help 'em — but they always save themselves."

~~Dialogue with Russia? Fifth, a~~

great change is taking place in the American image of Russia.

Until the appearance of Sputnik I there had been an ambivalent attitude here of fearing communism but denigrating Russia's capacity to become an important power. Today communism as an ideology is still feared, but no responsible person believes that Russia is any longer a backward country, or that the policy of "containment" first proposed by George F. Kennan and now rejected by him is any longer possible. Nor is it possible, in a rapidly changing world, for either us or the Russians to maintain the *status quo*.

We are thus left with two choices. Either we shall have to accept the prospect of resolving existing conflicts with Russia by military means, or we shall have to negotiate with Russia about these conflicts.

All of us—democracies and totalitarian states—know that war today will have a dimension it has never had in previous history: the dimension of world-wide destruction of men and resources.

Thus negotiations are essential if the possibility of destruction never before known is to be avoided. Whatever form negotiations between the West and the U.S.S.R. may take, we should not be in the least discouraged if they should occupy months, or even years. For the issues at stake

~~are crucial. They add up to the~~

chances of man's survival on earth—before he can even hope to conquer space. Mr. Hammarskjöld is profoundly aware of the need for what he calls a "dialogue" between nations. In this respect he draws inspiration from the writings of the German theologian Martin Buber, who now lives in Israel and whom he visited on his trip to the Middle East this winter.

Buber contends that today, in contrast to past periods of history, we have no intervals of peace between wars—only cold wars succeeding hot wars. He argues that this situation must be changed by a continuing dialogue with our opponents—whether or not we trust them; for lack of trust is the very question which precludes any dialogue conducive to peace.

Even if this dialogue achieves the most favorable results, we cannot expect a world which will be exactly tailored to our hearts' desire. For no matter how successful we may all be in avoiding war and creating peace and plenty, we shall have to accept the fact that the world is made up of many diverse peoples whose ideas and aspirations may not—and do not have to—coincide with ours.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The eighth of nine articles on "Great Decisions . . . 1959"—Reshaping Foreign Policy Amid Revolutions—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)

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